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 Chapter 5 
 The Digital Single Market and Legal 
Certainty: A Critical Analysis 
 Alex  Geert  Castermans ,  Ruben  de  Graaff , and  Matthias  Haentjens 
 Abstract  This chapter critically examines the CESL from the viewpoint of its 
capability to provide legal certainty for commercial actors. This chapter’s analysis 
focuses on three important stages in the life cycle of a contract, seen from a business 
perspective: the  scope rules that determine whether the CESL applies to a contract 
(para.  5.2 ), the  interpretation of entire agreement clauses (para.  5.3 ) and the legal 
consequences of a  breach of contract (para.  5.4 ). The chapter concludes that, with a 
few notable exceptions, the CESL rules do not enable contracting parties to predict, 
with a suffi cient degree of certainty, the legal consequences of entering into the 
contract. From a business perspective, the CESL rules are therefore not crafted well 
enough to serve as a  blueprint for future legislation. 
5.1  The Bundling Career of King Rex 
 In his tale about the bundling career of Rex, a fi ctitious king who wants to reform 
the law in his country, Lon Fuller distinguishes eight important  principles of inter-
nal morality . One of them is the duty to adopt clear rules:
 The dismay of Rex’s subjects was all the more intense, therefore, when his code became 
available and it was discovered that it was truly a masterpiece of obscurity. Legal experts 
who studied it declared that there was not a single sentence in it that could be understood 
either by an ordinary citizen or by a trained lawyer. Indignation became general and soon a 
picket appeared before the royal palace carrying a sign that read, “How can anybody follow 
a rule that nobody can understand?” 1 
 The former European Commission was almost as ambitious as the late king Rex. 
In 2011, it proposed to create a Common European Sales Law (CESL), in order to 
1  LL Fuller,  The Morality of Law (Revised edition) (New Haven, Yale University Press 1969) 36. 
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promote and facilitate cross-border trade within the European internal market. 2 The 
instrument was to be used in business to consumer (‘B2C’) and business to business 
(‘B2B’) contracts. According to the Commission, parties should be able to choose 
for ‘a single uniform set of contract laws’ to govern ‘the full life cycle of a contract’. 3 
Evidently, the Commission aimed to provide these parties with clear and consistent 
rules that provide for legal certainty:
 This Regulation enables traders to rely on a  common set of rules and use the same contract 
terms for all their cross-border transactions thereby reducing unnecessary costs while  pro-
viding a high degree of legal certainty . 4 
 The European Consumer Organisation BEUC was not convinced:
 This optional tool would increase legal complexity,  introduce great legal uncertainty , 
undermine existing rules on private international law and [sic] as well as consumer protec-
tion standards in a number of countries. 5 
 What does legal certainty demand, in terms of legislation? In many respects, this 
is a topical subject. In the Netherlands, it has been given particular attention since 
the publication of  De wet als kunstwerk (‘Legislation as a work of art’) by the Dutch 
scholar and senator Willem Witteveen, who died in the MH17 crash before the book 
was published. 6 Witteveen adds two commandments to the eight principles of 
Fuller. He emphasises  autonomy and the need for self-regulation, and he stresses 
that rules should  guide behaviour, and not enforce it. 
 It is also a topical question on the European level. When, by the end of 2014, a 
new European Commission took offi ce,  Better Regulation became one of its priori-
ties. Vice-President Frans Timmermans, who is in charge of this agenda, has repeat-
edly stated that the EU legislator should focus on the “big issues”:
 First of all we need to change the attitude that only if I make law am I contributing. There 
are other ways of contributing without necessarily having to legislate. And this is a cultural 
thing. We believe we don’t exist if we don’t make laws. 7 
2  European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on a Common European Sales Law, Brussels 11.10.2011, COM (2011) 635. Explanatory 
Memorandum to the Regulation, 4; Art 1 Regulation. This draft Regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council consisted of two parts: Annex I, containing the substantive sales law 
rules; and the Regulation itself, containing scope rules and other formal provisions. In this chapter, 
provisions of the Regulation itself will be referred to as CESL Reg., while provisions of the 
 substantive part will be referred to simply as CESL. We will refer to the Commission proposal 
(COM (2011) 635 fi nal, 2011/0284(COD)), unless indicated otherwise. 
3  European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on a Common European Sales Law, Brussels 11.10.2011, COM (2011) 635, 16, para 6. 
4 Art 1 (2) CESL Reg (emphasis added). 
5  Joint call by consumers’ organisations and e-commerce businesses to reject the Commission’s 
proposal for a Common European Sales Law regulation , letter to EP members, 10 June 2013 
(emphasis added). See  http://www.fdih.dk/media/1207735/brev_om_cesl_m_beuc_og_ecom-
merce_europe_juli_2013.pdf 
6  W Witteveen,  De wet als kunstwerk. Een andere fi losofi e van het recht (Den Haag, Boom 
Juridische uitgevers, 2014). 
7  Interview with Vice-President Timmermans,  https://euobserver.com/political/127456 
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 On 16 December 2014 the EU Commission presented its Work Programme for 
2015 to the European Parliament. The CESL is listed as item 60 in the Annex of 
withdrawn proposals. 8 This does not, however, mean that these rules are completely 
beyond consideration. The Annex states that the proposal is being modifi ed ‘in 
order to fully unleash the potential of e-commerce in the Digital Single Market’. 
Creating a connected digital single market is indeed one of the top priorities of the 
Juncker Commission. 9 One of the aims will be to simplify rules for online digital 
purchases by consumers. 10 It is therefore expected that the content of the CESL 
rules and the amendments proposed by the European Parliament will serve as a 
 blueprint to draft a new instrument, as part of an ambitious digital single market 
package. 11 
 A critical examination of the CESL rules against the commandments of legal 
certainty is therefore still relevant. But what does legal certainty demand? If we fol-
low Fuller, Van Gerven and Lierman, 12 and Witteveen, legal certainty demands 
such rules to be (1) accessible and clear, (2) calculable and reliable, and (3) feasible 
and enforceable. The  fi rst requirement focuses on the content of the rule, which has 
to be intelligible and clear, in order to enable the legal subject concerned to  predict 
its legal position with a reasonably suffi cient degree of certainty and foresee the 
legal consequences of his decisions. It also concerns the requirement of coherence 
of the legal order as a whole, and the consistency of its different branches. The 
 second requirement focuses on the durability of legislation: rules may not be altered 
overnight and changes should be accompanied by a proper law of transitions. The 
 third requirement entails that the legislator takes into account whether the rule is 
achievable in practical terms: no legal subject should be required to do the impos-
sible, nor should government agencies be held to enforce the unenforceable. 
 In this chapter, we assume that the CESL rules, if adopted as a part of the digital 
single market package, will fulfi l the second and third requirement. We assume that 
they will not be changed overnight or without proper arrangements, and that these 
rules will be applied by the Member States courts and enforceable by the same. In 
the present context, we wish to measure whether the CESL rules meet the fi rst 
requirement of accessibility and clarity. Thus, we ask ourselves: are these rules 
well-crafted or ill-conceived? Do they really enable contracting parties to predict, 
with a reasonably suffi cient degree of certainty, the legal consequences of entering 
into a CESL contract? We are aware that we should to some extent be cautious, for 
we recognise that drafting a piece of legislation, especially on the international 
8  http://ec.europa.eu/atwork/pdf/cwp_2015_withdrawals_en.pdf 
9  http://ec.europa.eu/atwork/pdf/cwp_2015_new_initiatives_en.pdf 
10  See  https://ec.europa.eu/futurium/digital4eu 
11  See the blog by Eric Clive,  http://www.epln.law.ed.ac.uk/2015/01/07/proposal-for-a-common-
european-sales-law-withdrawn/ 
12  W van Gerven & S Lierman,  Algemeen Deel. Veertig jaar later (Mechelen, Kluwer, 2010) nr 66: 
‘Aan de hand daarvan worden hierna beknopt de drie uit het  rechtszekerheidsbeginsel voortvloei-
ende  hoofdeisen besproken: (i) toegankelijkheid en duidelijkheid; (ii) berekenbaarheid en betrou-
wbaarheid; (iii) uitvoerbaarheid en handhaafbaarheid.’ 
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level, is without any doubt a diffi cult task and sometimes, any legislation (however 
unclear) may be better than none. No legislation is perfect or immune to 
criticism. 13 
 However, bearing in mind the ambition of the new European Commission to aim 
for  Better Regulation , we do think that it is necessary to hold the CESL rules against 
the stated objective of ‘providing a high degree of certainty’, in order to see whether 
they are fi t for further implementation in the future digital single market package. In 
this chapter, we will not provide a commentary on each and every CESL provision, 14 
or thoroughly compare the CESL with other legal systems. 15 Instead, we will focus 
on three important stages in the life cycle of a contract, seen from a  business perspec-
tive . 16 After all, the CESL was meant, to a large extent, to serve traders’ interests (see 
Art. 1 (2) CESL Reg. cited above). Moreover, the trader will normally determine the 
rules of a sales contract and therefore has to be tempted to choose the instrument in 
the fi rst place. We will examine the  scope rules that determined whether CESL 
applies to a contract (para. 5.2), the  interpretation of entire agreement clauses (para. 
5.3) and the legal consequences of a  breach of contract (para. 5.4). 
5.2  Conclusion, Entering into a CESL Contract 
5.2.1  General 
 As stated above, accessibility and clarity are critical ramifi cations of legal certainty. 
This requirement entails that parties to a contract wish to be certain about the rules 
that apply to the contract they conclude. Consequently: (a) they wish to know the 
extent of the freedom they have to negotiate the rules applicable to their contract; 
and, as a corollary of the same, (b) they wish to know which rules of mandatory law 
will apply. Because the CESL has been proposed as an  optional instrument, these 
issues are particularly acute. Not only does the CESL itself contain rules that are 
mandatory or semi-mandatory (i.e. parties can agree to derogate from the CESL 
provided the derogation is not to the detriment of the consumer) and thus may set 
aside party agreement, 17 but the same agreement may also be set aside by (mandatory 
rules of) the otherwise applicable, national law, even when the parties have chosen 
to apply the CESL. 
13  Cf. S Vogenauer, ‘Drafting and Interpretation of a European Contract Law Instrument’, in G 
Dannemann & S Vogenauer (eds),  The Common European Sales Law in Context (Oxford, OUP, 
2013) 83–84. 
14  Eg R Schulze (ed),  Common European Sales Law (CESL). A Commentary (Oxford, Hart, 2012). 
15  Eg G Dannemann & S Vogenauer (eds),  The Common European Sales Law in Context: 
Interactions with English and German Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013). 
16  For a combined business and consumer perspective: A.G. Castermans, ‘Towards a European 
Contract Law through Social Dialogue’,  European Review of Contract Law (7) 2011 (360). 
17  Examples of semi-mandatory rules may be found in Arts 69, 71, 75 and 77 CESL, examples of 
(fully) mandatory rules in Arts 70 and 74 CESL. 
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 In case parties have mistakenly thought that their contract would fall within the 
CESL’s scope, (parts of) the CESL might then apply as a matter of ‘incorporation by 
reference’, i.e. the CESL might then apply as if it were clauses agreed by the parties. 
Yet such clauses cannot preclude mandatory rules of the otherwise applicable national 
law. Moreover, under Article 6(2) of the Rome I Regulation, 18 mandatory rules of 
the consumer’s jurisdiction will apply, should this law, in short, protect him better than 
the (erroneously) chosen CESL rules or the otherwise applicable national law would. 19 
Thus, from a predictability perspective, it is of the utmost importance that parties are 
suffi ciently enabled to determine whether the CESL applies. It is evident that the same 
predictability is, to a large extent, dependent on clear scope rules. 20 
 In this paragraph, we assess whether the CESL scope rules are suffi ciently clear. 
Thus, we assess whether contracting parties, when similar scope rules apply, can 
predict with a reasonably suffi cient degree of certainty whether a court of a European 
Member State will apply those rules they thought would apply. We will therefore 
assume that a court in a European Member State will be requested to judge on the 
application of the CESL rules; that this court has jurisdiction; and that the otherwise 
applicable, national law will be the law of a Member State, as the proposed CESL 
could only be chosen as a ‘second’ law of contract of a Member State. 21 It will be 
concluded that contracting parties, most notably the trader, need to make rather 
complex legal qualifi cations which, it is submitted, would not have brought  certainty 
in many cases, and will not bring certainty in future cases, if the EU legislature were 
to adopt a similar approach in its future contract rules for online purchases of digital 
content and tangible goods. 
5.2.2  Formal Scope Rules 
 The scope of the CESL is limited in two ways: both formally and materially. The 
CESL is limited formally, because it applies only to parties of certain jurisdictions 
(territorial limitation), only to certain parties (personal limitation), and only when 
(explicitly) chosen. The CESL is limited materially, because it only applies to cer-
tain types of contract. 
18  In full: Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 
2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I), OJ L 177. 
19  See J Thomas et al. (eds),  Statement of the European Law Institute on the Proposal for a 
Regulation on the Common European Sales Law (ELI, Vienna, 2012) 321 (“ELI Statement”), to be 
consulted via  www.europeanlawinstitute.eu/projects/publications/ , 21. 
20  Cf. S Whittaker, ‘Identifying the Legal Costs of Operation of the Common European Sales Law’, 
 Common Market Law Review 50 (2013) 95. 
21  See Recital (10) CESL. On the ramifi cations of this policy choice, ie to have CESL function as a 
‘second’ set of contract law rules, rather than, eg, the 28th set of European contract law rules, see, 
eg, M Fornasier, ‘“28” versus “2. Regime” – ‘Kollisionsrechtliche Aspekte eines optionalen 
europäischen Vertragsrechts’,  RabelsZ Bd. 76 (2012) 401 et seq. and M Lehmann, ‘Dogmatische 
Konstruktion der Einwahl in das EU-Kaufrecht (2., 28. oder integriertes Regime) und die prak-
tischen Folgen’, in M Gebauer (ed)  Gemeinsames Europäisches Kaufrecht – Anwendungsbereich 
und kollisionsrechtliche Einbettung (2013) 67 et seq. 
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5.2.2.1  Territorial Scope: Cross-Border Requirement 
 As a matter of principle, only cross-border contracts are governed by the CESL. 22 
This sounds clear enough, but how would it work out in practice? The CESL distin-
guishes between business to consumer (‘B2C’) and business to business (‘B2B’) 
cross-border contracts. If the contract is to be B2C, the ‘address indicated by the 
consumer, the delivery address for goods, or the billing address’ of the consumer 
must be located in a different country than the ‘habitual residence’ of the business, 
or in the CESL terminology: the trader. 23 Thus, parties to a contract must fi rst estab-
lish whether they qualify as a ‘trader’ or a ‘consumer’. 
 The ‘trader’ – ‘consumer’ qualifi cation must be made on the basis of the 
 defi nitions of these terms as provided in the CESL Reg. Under Article 2, caput and 
under (e) the CESL Reg., ‘trader’ means any natural or legal person who is acting 
for purposes relating to that person’s trade, business, craft, or profession, while 
under (f), ‘consumer’ means any natural person who is acting for purposes which 
are outside that person’s trade, business, craft, or profession. 24 
 Then, it must be determined where the addresses of both parties are located. The 
consumer’s address (i.e. the address indicated by him, his delivery address, or his 
billing address) seems straightforward enough. However, it may lead to ambiguity 
in the following situations: a consumer’s habitual residence might lie outside the 
EU/EEA, while the address indicated by him, the delivery address for goods, or his 
billing address is inside the EU/EEA. Then, pursuant to Article 6(2) of Rome 
I Regulation, the mandatory law of the jurisdiction in which his habitual residence 
lies applies, should this law, in short, protect him better than the CESL would. Thus, 
even if CESL would (also) apply under Article 4 CESL Reg., then the law of a 
jurisdiction outside the EU/EEA might also apply if it protects the consumer more. 
More generally, Article 6(2) Rome I Regulation applies to all transactions of traders 
with consumers whose habitual residences and addresses lie outside the EU. 25 In all 
these cases, a prudent trader would have to investigate whether the law of the 
 consumer’s jurisdiction protects the consumer more, which was exactly what the 
CESL tried to avoid. 26 
22  Recital 13–15, Arts 1(1) and 4 CESL Reg. 
23 Art 4(3) CESL Reg. 
24  Even these defi nitions are not as straightforward as they might seem, as evidenced by the follow-
ing Parliament amendment: “(f) ‘consumer’ means any natural person who is acting for purposes 
which are outside that person’s trade, business, craft, or profession;  where the contract is con-
cluded for purposes partly within and partly outside that person’s trade and the trade purpose is 
so limited as not to be predominant in the overall context of the contract, that person shall also be 
considered to be a consumer; (See the wording of recital 17 of Directive 2011/83/EU) ” [emphasis 
in the original]. This is not to mention the diffi culties that arise when one of the parties acts both 
as a consumer and a trader, or when it is unclear in what capacity the same party is acting. Cf. ECJ 
20 January 2005, C-464/01, ECLI:EU:C:2005:32 ( Johann Gruber/Bay Wa AG ). 
25  See also J Basedow, in M Gebauer (ed)  Gemeinsames Europäisches Kaufrecht – 
Anwendungsbereich und kollisionsrechtliche Einbettung (2013) 16. 
26  See Explanatory Memorandum to CESL, 2–4. 
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 The CESL’s reference to the trader’s address (habitual residence) is even more 
problematic: it is his ‘place of central administration’ ( siege réel ). 27 However, this 
rule does not apply if the ‘the contract is concluded in the course of the operations 
of a branch, agency or any other establishment’ of the trader. In such instance, that 
‘branch, agency or any other establishment’ should be the relevant location for pur-
poses of CESL (Art. 4(5) CESL Reg.). 
 As a connecting factor, the trader’s  siege reel is problematic, as it is not always 
easy to ascertain where an enterprise’s ‘place of central administration’ is. The 
Netherlands private international law for instance, does not, as a matter of principle, 
recognise the place of central administration but rather the place of statutory seat as 
the connecting factor for, in short, issues of company law (Art. 10:118 Dutch Civil 
Code ( Burgerlijk Wetboek )). Also, the Insolvency Regulation refers, as a matter of 
principle, to the jurisdiction of a company’s ‘centre of main interest’ (a  siege réel 
rule of sorts), but, presumably to provide certainty, ‘the place of the registered offi ce 
shall be presumed to be the centre of its main interests in the absence of proof to the 
contrary’. 28 
 Even more problematic is the exception for branches: if a ‘branch, agency or any 
other establishment’ would be ‘the relevant location’ for purposes of the CESL, the 
jurisdiction of that branch, agency or other establishment would be relevant for 
purposes of establishing whether the cross-border requirement has been met. First, 
in many instances, it is submitted, it would be virtually impossible to establish 
whether an ‘establishment’ would be a ‘relevant location’. What to think of all 
 contracts that are to be concluded via internet (which might be the only kind of 
contracts that the future contract law instrument will apply to): what location would 
then be ‘relevant’? Surely not the location where the trader’s IT-equipment is locat-
ed. 29 Second, this exception for branches may lead to a possibility of legal arbitrage 
by multi-national traders, which possibility is not open to SMEs. 30 Multi-national 
traders with branches all over Europe may wish to designate branches not located in 
their consumers’ jurisdictions as the ‘relevant locations’, so that the cross-border 
requirement will be met and the CESL may apply – when more favourable to the 
trader. The converse (i.e. that traders designate branches located in their consumers’ 
jurisdictions as the ‘relevant locations’) might be equally possible, so that the 
otherwise applicable, national private law must apply, rather than the CESL. 
 Also, Member States may opt-in and have the CESL apply to all traders with 
habitual residence in its jurisdiction and to consumers with their addresses in the 
27 Art 4(4) CESL Reg. 
28 Art 3(1) Council regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on insolvency proceedings, OJ 
L 160. 
29  Cf. article 4(2)(a) of the Convention on the Law Applicable to Certain Rights in Respect of 
Securities Held with an Intermediary (concluded 5 July 2006): “For the purposes of paragraph (1) 
(a), an offi ce is not engaged in a business or other regular activity of maintaining securities accounts 
[the Convention’s connecting factor, the authors] – (a) merely because it is a place where the tech-
nology supporting the bookkeeping or data processing for securities accounts is located; (…).” 
30  See also ELI Statement (n 19) 20. 
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same, and thus forego the cross-border requirement. 31 This opt-in possibility further 
complicates matters. Pursuant to the cross-border requirements discussed above, 
the CESL might not apply. Yet the CESL could nonetheless apply, provided all 
other CESL Reg. requirements for applicability have been met,  and the otherwise 
applicable law would be the law of a Member State that has opted-in. Consequently, 
not only must parties investigate per transaction whether the scope rules of the 
CESL Reg. are met, but also (if the CESL would not apply under its own cross- border 
requirement) whether the otherwise applicable, national law would be the law of the 
same Member State as the habitual residence and addresses of the parties, and 
whether that Member State has opted into CESL under Article 13(a) CESL Reg. 
 Finally, one of the parties must be located in the EU. This means that in B2B 
contracts, one of the (two) traders must have his habitual residence in EU, while in 
B2C contracts, one of the addresses of the consumer must be in the EU. 32 
5.2.2.2  Personal Scope: Consumer and SME Requirement 
 As stated above, the CESL is limited formally in three ways: it applies only to 
 parties of certain jurisdictions (territorial limitation), only to certain parties 
(personal limitation), and only when (explicitly) chosen. The personal limitation 
entails, in short, that the CESL only applies if the buyer is a consumer, or, in case 
both seller and buyer(s) are traders, one of the parties is a small or medium-sized 
enterprise (‘SME’). 33 
 When applying the CESL, parties should therefore not only determine whether 
the cross-border requirement is met, but also whether this personal requirement is 
met. To that purpose, parties must – as in the case of the territorial requirement – 
ascertain whether they qualify as a ‘trader’ or a ‘consumer’ as defi ned in the CESL 
Reg. 
 In case both parties qualify as ‘traders’, they would have to ascertain whether 
one of them qualifi es as an SME. For this qualifi cation, Article 7(2) CESL Reg. 
provides requirements, which – pursuant to Recital (21) – must be interpreted in the 
light of Commission Recommendation 2003/361. 34 Consequently, a trader would 
qualify as an SME if: (i) it employs fewer than 250 employees calculated by Annual 
Work Units;  and (ii) its turnover does not exceed EUR 50 million; or (iii) its balance 
sheet does not exceed EUR 43 million, calculated according to latest approved 
accounting period (and, should none be available: according to a  bone fi de 
estimate). 35 Articles 4–6 of the Annex to Commission Recommendation 2003/361 
31 Art 13(a) CESL Reg. 
32 Art 4(3)(b) CESL Reg. and Recital 13. 
33 Art 7(1) CESL Reg. 
34  In full: Commission Recommendation of 6 May 2003 concerning the defi nition of micro, small 
and medium-sized enterprises (notifi ed under document number C(2003) 1422), 2003/361/EC, OJ 
L 124/36. 
35 Art 2(1) of Commission Recommendation 2003/361. 
A.G. Castermans et al.
53
provide further directors for the way to calculate the staff headcount, the fi nancial 
amounts and reference period. Importantly, these tests must be applied per ‘autonomous 
enterprise’, i.e. an enterprise that is not a ‘partner enterprise’, nor a ‘linked enter-
prise’ as defi ned in Article 3(2) and (3) of the Annex to Commission Recommendation 
2003/361 (which defi nitions fi ll almost an entire page of the Offi cial Journal). 
 Thus, this SME test is extremely complex and diffi cult to establish, especially as 
regards concerns or group-enterprises. It can be safely assumed that some traders 
may not wish to investigate or rely on the declaration of their trader counterparty as 
regards their employee count or turnover/balance sheet numbers. It has even been 
argued that enterprises themselves nor their advisors often know whether they qual-
ify – at the time of conclusion of a contract – as an SME. 36 The following scenario 
would therefore be plausible. Two traders wish to conclude a contract under the 
CESL. Due to a (considering the varying size of this company perfectly understand-
able) miscalculation of the headcount of one the parties’ companies, they are mis-
taken in their belief that this party qualifi es as an SME. As a result, they are mistaken 
in their belief that the CESL would apply under its own scope rules. As explained 
above, under para. 5.2.1., the CESL would then only apply as a matter of ‘incorpo-
ration by reference’, i.e. the CESL might then apply as if it were clauses agreed by 
the parties. Yet these CESL clauses could be set aside by mandatory rules of the 
otherwise applicable national law, which neither party has realised nor wished to 
investigate. In fact: the whole point for the parties in question to choose the CESL 
to apply was to avoid such time consuming and costly investigation. Consequently, 
it would be rational for the same enterprises not to rely on a choice for the CESL. 37 
 Finally, and similar to the cross-border requirement, Member States may opt-in 
to have the CESL apply to all traders and thus forego the SME-requirement. 38 
Consequently, parties must investigate per transaction whether the scope rules of 
the CESL Reg. are met, but also (if the CESL would not apply under its own SME 
requirement) whether the otherwise applicable, national law would be the law of a 
Member State that has opted into CESL under Article 13(b) CESL Reg. Other than 
as regards the cross-border requirement, the otherwise applicable national law need 
not be the law of the Member State where one of the parties has its habitual resi-
dence or address. 
5.2.2.3  Scope: Requirement of (Explicit) Choice 
 The CESL is meant to be an opt-in instrument. This means that the CESL only 
applies if chosen and agreed by the parties. This agreement to have the CESL apply, 
i.e. its existence and validity, is governed by the CESL itself. 39 Again, when  analysed 
more closely from the perspective of a party who wishes the CESL to apply, the 
36  Basedow (n 25) 18. 
37  See also ELI Statement (n 19) 13 and 18–19. 
38 Art 13(b) CESL Reg. 
39  Recital (10) and Arts 8–9 CESL Reg. 
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CESL Reg. provisions on this choice of law agreement are far more complex than 
one might think at fi rst sight. 
 Also as regards this choice of law, the CESL distinguishes between agreements 
made by a trader and consumer on the one hand, and by traders on the other. In case 
of a B2C contract, the choice to have the CESL apply must meet the following 
cumulative criteria: (i) the consumer’s consent to have the CESL apply must be 
given in a statement that is separate ‘from the statement indicating the agreement to 
conclude a contract’; (ii) the consumer’s consent must be given explicitly; (iii) the 
trader must have confi rmed the same consent; (iv) on a durable medium; and (v) the 
choice of law must relate to the CESL in its entirety. 40 It needs no argument that 
these criteria are rather elaborate, which enhances the risk of non-compliance with 
one or more of them and thus of non-applicability of the CESL. By contrast, in case 
of a B2B contract there are no further requirements. 41 
5.2.3  Material Scope Rules 
 As stated above, the CESL is limited formally but also materially, as it applies to 
certain types of contract only. Thus, parties who wish the CESL to apply must 
determine whether they and their contract fall within the formal scope of the CESL 
(as discussed above), and also take the following three steps so as to determine 
whether their contract falls within the material ambit of the CESL: (i) parties must 
determine whether their contract concerns a sale of goods, supply of digital content, 
or related service contract. If not, the CESL cannot apply, at least not with prejudice 
to mandatory rules of otherwise applicable national law (Art. 5 CESL Reg.); 
(ii) parties must determine whether no exception applies as defi ned in Article 6 
CESL Reg. Under this provision, the CESL may not apply if the contract is mixed-
purpose or contains a form of consumer credit (but only in case of B2C contracts); 
and (iii) parties must determine whether no exception applies following from the 
defi nitions of Article 2 CESL Reg. 
 Under the defi nitions of Article 2 CESL Reg., a sale, for instance, can only be 
governed by the CESL if it leads to a transfer of ownership of goods against a price 
(Articles 2 caput and under (k), and 1(1) and 3 CESL Reg.). ‘Goods’ are defi ned as 
‘tangible movable items’ under Article 2 caput and under (h) CESL Reg., so that 
electricity, gas, water (unless in limited volume and set quantity) are excluded. 
However, it is unclear how parties must determine whether the sale leads to a ‘transfer 
of ownership’, which may be problematic in cases of retention of title, a fi duciary 
40 Arts 8(2) and (3) CESL Reg. 
41  Yet this freedom for traders to ‘cherry pick’ and choose which parts of CESL to apply seems 
inconsistent with Art 1 CESL, which implies that mandatory provisions of CESL may not be 
excluded. Pursuant to an amendment of the European Parliament, traders would not be allowed to 
escape such mandatory rules. European Parliament Committee on Legal Affairs, Draft Report 
2011/0284 (COD) of 18 February 2013 (“EP Draft Report”) 41. 
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transfer and termination of a provisional transfer of ownership. 42 This qualifi cation 
must probably be made under the applicable private international law, as the CESL 
itself explicitly excludes ‘property law including the transfer of ownership’. 43 
Consequently, this exclusion may lead to diverging interpretations of (the scope of) 
the CESL between Member States. 
 Finally, the exclusion of mixed contracts may lead to uncertainty. 44 Even if a 
minor part of a given contract does not fall under any of the defi nitions of sale, 
 supply of digital content, or related service contracts as just discussed, then the 
entire contract falls outside the scope of the CESL and must be deemed governed by 
the otherwise applicable national law. 45 Consequently, if a seller grants the buyer 
deferred payment, the CESL does not apply to the entire contract as such deferred 
payment qualifi es as ‘credit’, which makes it outside the scope of the CESL under 
Article 6(1) CESL Reg. It is unclear, however, whether a tax payment policy would 
also qualify as ‘credit’ so that CESL would not apply. 46 It seems safe to assume that 
this will force traders to make separate contracts, which will add to complexity and 
therefore to uncertainty, especially if sale and credit would be closely linked (as 
they are in many cases – think of car sales where fi nancing forms an important part 
of the sale offer). 
5.2.4  Preliminary Conclusion 
 From the above, it follows that the CESL would not have brought legal certainty as 
advertised as regards its scope rules. 47 Both the formal scope rules (territorial, per-
sonal, choice) and material scope rules have been tested on clarity and predictabil-
ity. Not only are the scope rules – considered as a set – relatively complex which, 
by defi nition, is a form of unclearness and thus may lead to uncertainty, but the rules 
individually are also diffi cult to use and in the cases discussed do not lead to 
unequivocal answers. Some scope rules are extremely diffi cult to establish: this is 
the case when parties have to ascertain whether they qualify as an SME. What is 
more, some scope rules are virtually impossible to establish: this is the case, for 
instance, when parties have to ascertain what the ‘relevant location’ of an internet 
retailer is that has branches all over the EU. Finally, some scope rules require an 
42  In its Draft Report, the European Parliament proposes to review the exclusion of retention of title 
clauses after fi ve years of CESL operation; EP Draft Report (n 40) 21. 
43  Recital (27) CESL. 
44  See ELI Statement (n 19) 21–22. Under the European Parliament proposal, this rule will be 
abandoned; EP Draft Report (n 40) et seq. 
45  See ELI Statement (n 19) 21. 
46  Cf. ELI Statement (n 19) 22. 
47 Accord: S Schaafsma, ‘IPR en EPR, Over wisselwerking, eenheidenverscheidenheid’ (inaugural 
lecture Leiden, 2014) 11; and Whittaker (n 19) 108. 
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investigation into the otherwise applicable law: this is the case when opt-in rules 
apply and as regards property law matters. 
 Thus, for the CESL scope rules, its objective of certainty, or, in any event, its 
objective of not having to establish otherwise applicable law, is not met. In order to 
enhance their practicability, it is submitted that the scope rules should be individually 
redrafted, or alternatively, exclusions and refi nements should be deleted, as these 
greatly contribute to the complexity of the current set. 48 It is foreseeable that the 
rules will not become clearer if the future instrument will be limited to ‘distance 
contracts’, i.e. online purchases of digital content and tangible goods’. This will add 
yet another limiting scope rule to the already existing ones. 49 
5.3  The Interpretation of an Entire Agreement Clause 
5.3.1  General 
 Suppose the CESL rules are clearly applicable and a contract has been concluded. 
One of the main concerns of businesses will then be its interpretation by the courts. 
How much trust and certainty may they put in their texts? Traditionally, this has 
been a bone of contention between common law and civil law. Common law 
 emphasises the literal interpretation of the contract, whereas civil law stresses the 
importance of a more objective interpretation. Although some convergence between 
civil and common law may be noted since Lord Hoffman famously stated that 
‘interpretation is the ascertainment of the meaning which the document would 
convey to a reasonable person’, 50 differences may still exist. 
 Commercial parties often stress the importance of the wordings of a contract by 
including a so-called ‘entire agreement-’or ‘merger clause’. Such a clause states 
that it is the intention of the parties that the written document contains the entirety 
of the contract between the parties. The purpose is to preclude a party to rely on a 
promise or statement, made during the negotiations, when it is not expressly 
 contained in the written document. Does the content of the CESL rules facilitate 
parties who wish to attain this form of legal certainty? 
48 Accord: Basedow (n 24) 21; and H Eidenmüller et al. ‘Der Vorschlag für eine Verordnung über 
ein Gemeinsames Europäisches Kaufrecht’,  JZ 67 (2012) 288–289. 
49  See the EP Draft Report (n 40) 35 and the Public consultation on contract rules for online pur-
chases of digital content and tangible goods, issued by the European Commission on 12 June 2015, 
see  http://ec.europa.eu/justice/newsroom/contract/opinion/150609_en.htm 
50  Investors Compensation Scheme v. West Bromwich Building Society [1997] UKHL 28; [1998] 1 
All ER 98; [1998] 1 WLR 896 (19th June, 1997). 
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5.3.2  Interpretation Rules 
 Contracts are to be interpreted according to the meaning which a reasonable person 
would give to them. 51 The common intention of the parties should in any case be of 
paramount importance, even if this differs from the normal meaning of the expres-
sions used in the contract. 52 Specifi c intentions of one party are relevant if at the 
time of the conclusion of the contract the other party was aware, or could be expected 
to have been aware, of such intentions. 53 Article 59 CESL adds that regard may be 
had to various facts and circumstances. Although the ‘nature and purpose of the 
contract’ is mentioned, 54 a preference for  literal interpretation in business-to- 
business relationships is not evident from Article 59 CESL. 
 To be certain, parties could agree that there are no other obligations than those 
stated in the contract. For one, the CESL does not forbid to exclude the application 
of its interpretation rules in commercial contracts. 55 Article 72 CESL is devoted to 
such an entire agreement- or merger clause:
 1.  Where a contract in writing includes a term stating that the document contains all con-
tract terms (a merger clause), any prior statements, undertakings or agreements which 
are not contained in the document do not form part of the contract. 
 2.  Unless the contract otherwise provides, a merger clause does not prevent the parties’ 
prior statements from being used to interpret the contract. 56 
 These paragraphs do not deserve a beauty prize. They may lead to a situation in 
which statements, commitments, and arrangements that have not been included in 
the written contact  are not part of the contract (para. 1), while nevertheless prior 
statements  may be taken into account when interpreting the contract (para. 2). Thus, 
apparently, these statements, taken separately, cannot serve as a ground for any 
contractual obligation. Yet they may be used to substantiate a line of reasoning. 
This could be confusing if the line of reasoning results in an interpretation that 
favours prior statements over the wordings of the contract. Was this the real inten-
tion of the parties? This proves that businesses do themselves a great service by 
also – explicitly 57 – excluding the use of such statements, even when they have 
51 Art 58 (3) CESL. 
52 Art 58 (1) CESL. 
53 Art 58 (2) CESL. 
54 Art 59 (g) CESL. 
55  In consumer contracts, however, (ie contracts in which one of the parties qualifi es as a ‘con-
sumer’, see also above, under para 2.2.1–2.2.2.) such an exclusion is disallowed (Art 64(2) CESL). 
56  The meaning of a merger clause in a consumer sale will be limited, since Article 72(3) provides 
that the consumer is not bound to such a clause and Article 72(4) forbids the parties to derogate 
from that rule. Hence, an agreed merger clause will only bind the professional party and is there-
fore not expected to be used in practice. About this in a critical sense EM Kieninger in Schulze 
et al. (eds),  Common European Sales Law (CESL) – Commentary (Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2012) 
353. 
57  Cf. Schulze et al. (eds),  Common European Sales Law (CESL) – Commentary (Baden-Baden, 
Nomos, 2012) 308 and 353. 
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included an entire agreement clause in their contract. Nonetheless, in spite of its 
somewhat ambiguous wordings, the CESL facilitates parties that wish to create 
legal certainty by using entire agreement- or merger clauses. 
 Yet, one caveat is necessary. One should bear in mind that an entire agreement- 
or merger clause needs to be interpreted itself. Take for example the Lundiform- 
case, in which the Dutch Supreme Court took a fi rm stand on what such a clause is 
all about. 58 The clause read:
 9.1.  This Agreement constitutes the entire agreement between the parties and supersedes 
any earlier written or oral arrangements and agreements made between the parties. (…) 
 9.5.  No variation of this agreement shall be valid unless it is in writing and signed by or on 
behalf of each of the parties. 
 The Dutch Supreme Court noted in general terms, after having emphasised that 
such a clause is a relevant circumstance for interpretation:
 (…) that an ‘entire agreement clause’ on itself is not an interpretation provision. The clause 
has a specifi c origin and function in the Anglo-American legal sphere, and has not auto-
matically a special meaning according to Dutch law. [T]he clause does not automatically 
preclude that for the interpretation of the terms in the contract signifi cance is attached to 
statements made or actions performed in the stage prior to the conclusion of the contract. 
 With regard to the specifi c clause in the Lundiform-case, the Supreme Court held 
that the Court of Appeal should have taken into account the following statements by 
Lundiform, referring to the way the contract between Lundiform and the other 
party, Mexx, had been concluded:
 (i)  that the parties have not negotiated about the written contract, in particular not about the 
text of [the entire agreement clause], 
  (ii)  that at the conclusion of the contract Lundiform was not assisted by a lawyer, and 
 (iii)  that the model contract had been drawn up by the legal department of Mexx. 
 Thus, the Supreme Court assumes that the decision not to negotiate a contract 
with the assistance of a professional lawyer must lead to the conclusion that there 
was in fact no equal bargaining power between the parties. As a consequence, the 
reason to attach great importance to the linguistic meaning of the contract would 
cease to be valid. 
 While this line of reasoning seems to be similar to paragraph 2 of Article 72, the 
CESL seems to be more subtle, as it takes into account whether the parties had equal 
bargaining power during their negotiations:
 To the extent that there is an inconsistency, contract terms which have been individually 
negotiated prevail over those which have not been individually negotiated within the 
meaning of Article 7. 59 
58  Dutch Supreme Court, 5/03/13, (2013)  NJ , 214 (Lundiform/Mexx). 
59  See for similar provisions: Article 5:104 PECL and Article II.-8:104 DCFR. Article 70 Common 
European Sales Law still adds to this that the supplier of a contract term that has not been individu-
ally negotiated (hence read: could not be negotiated) must have drawn the other party’s attention 
to this term. 
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 According to Article 7 (1) CESL, a contract term is not individually negotiated if 
it has been supplied by one party and the other party has ‘not been able to infl uence 
its content’. So, it is not decisive whether parties have in fact negotiated about a 
certain provision, but whether they have been able to question its wordings in the 
fi rst place. This may prove to be a useful criterion in business-to-business relation-
ships. After all, a professional party who is not satisfi ed by the contract terms should 
prove that it has not been able to infl uence their content. We believe this is just, for 
a contract should serve the parties as their law, including the tradesman who accepts 
a contractual term because he considers a contract profi table in its entirety. 
5.3.3  Preliminary Conclusion 
 The CESL stresses the importance of entire agreement clauses, while it provides for 
a criterion to assess whether parties could rely on such a clause. Not the absence of 
negotiations is decisive, but whether parties were able to infl uence the content of 
their contract terms. Despite the ambiguous formulation in Article 72 CESL, which 
implies that prior statements are not part of the contract but may nonetheless be 
taken into account when interpreting the contract, the CESL interpretation rules 
facilitate parties that wish to create legal certainty by using entire agreement- or 
merger clauses. We advise the Commission to consider these rules for its future 
instrument, in order to enhance the predictability of the contractual arrangements 
between commercial parties. 
5.4  The Legal Consequences of a Breach of Contract 
5.4.1  General 
 Unfortunately, contracting parties will not always live up to the expectations. 
During the lifecycle of a contract, their mutual relationship may take a turn for the 
worse. The buyer was full of anticipation, only to fi nd out that the delivered goods 
do not match his expectations and even cause losses and distress. The seller trusted 
that the other party would pay the price soon after delivery, but is now unable to 
reach his counterparty. When all else fails, 60 the scheme of remedies, which affects 
the enforcement of their rights, becomes of crucial importance to the contracting 
60  Of course, parties should fi rst try to seek a solution together, through consultation, mediation or 
alternative dispute resolution. This has the attention of the EU legislator as well,  cf. Directive 
2013/11/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on alternative dispute 
resolution for consumer disputes and amending Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 and Directive 
2009/22/EC (Directive on consumer ADR); Directive 2008/52/EC of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 21 May 2008 on certain aspects of mediation in civil and commercial matters. 
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parties. Any prudent contracting party would therefore want to know beforehand 
the range of available remedies, their hierarchy and the possibilities to dictate oth-
erwise in their contract. As a result, the degree of certainty provided by the remedial 
system will generally encourage or discourage parties to enter into a contract. 61 
 In this context, two issues divide the different European legal systems and 
 therefore deserve closer examination. First, the legal consequences of a breach of 
contract, and especially the relationship between damages, specifi c performance 
and termination (para. 5.4.2). Is the normal and automatic remedy  damages or 
 specifi c performance , and does  termination have a subsidiary character? Second, 
the relationship between contract and tort law (para. 5.4.3). Once a party claims 
damages, may he choose the most advantageous remedy or is he confi ned to base 
his claim on the CESL? 
5.4.2  The Relationship Between Performance, Damages 
and Termination 
5.4.2.1  Background: Different Approaches in Common and Civil Law 
 Common law and civil law traditions display great divergences when it comes to the 
remedies for breach of contract, at least in theory. While  damages are the normal 
and automatic remedy in the common law, 62 civil law generally aims at  performance 
of the obligations under the contract. 63 In the United Nations Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG), the positions were not recon-
ciled. 64 While the right to require performance was acknowledged, 65 the question of 
whether or not to award this remedy was left to the discretion of the national courts. 66 
This result has been criticised, for example by Erauw and Flechtner:
 When they approached the topic of remedies, the drafters seem to have abandoned hope of 
bridging gaps among domestic legal systems, and to have opted instead for incorporating 
61  Cf. V Mak,  Performance-oriented remedies in European sale of goods law (Oxford, Hart 
Publishing, 2009) 1. 
62  Cf. Lord Diplock in  Photo Production Ltd v Securicor Ltd [1980] AC 827 (HL) 848-9 and Lord 
Hoffmann in  Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd v Argyll Stores (Holdings) Ltd , [1998] AC 1 
(HL). 
63  See generally Mak (n 60) and H Sivesand,  The Buyer’s Remedies for Non-Conforming Goods 
(München, Sellier, 2005) 29  et seq. 
64  See AH Kastely, ‘The Right to Require Performance in International Sales: Towards an 
International Interpretation of the Vienna Convention’,  Washington Law Review 63 (1988) 
607–610. 
65 Art 46 (1) and 62 CISG. 
66 Art 28 CISG: ‘If, in accordance with the provisions of this Convention, one party is entitled to 
require performance of any obligation by the other party, a court is not bound to enter a judgment 
for specifi c performance unless the court would do so under its own law in respect of similar con-
tracts of sale not governed by this Convention.’ 
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more or less intact the different and even contradictory approaches of different legal 
 traditions. (…) The result is not so much a remedies system as a wilful bundling together of 
diverse elements, offering an aggrieved buyer or seller a diverse smorgasbord of remedy 
options from which to choose. 67 
 On the European level, an agreement was reached by introducing a clear hierar-
chy of remedies under the Consumer Sales Directive. 68 Under this Directive, the 
consumer has to give the seller the chance to cure a lack of conformity. 69 As a result, 
the consequences of a breach of contract are not entirely determined by the buyer’s 
choice for one remedy or the other, or purely by the economic interests of the seller. 
It has been argued that under Dutch law the remedial scheme now has gained an 
ever more subtle character, which gives the courts more power to intervene when a 
particular solution is seen as disproportionate. 70 This trend may be seen in interna-
tional sales law and even – according to Mak – in the common law, where the courts 
‘are beginning to show a tendency towards a wider scope for specifi c performance’. 71 
It is refl ected in recital 32 of the proposed CESL as well:
 The Common European Sales Law should aim at the preservation of a valid contract when-
ever possible and appropriate in view of the legitimate interests of the parties. 
 This development also affects the possibility to use the remedy of termination. 
This far-reaching ‘remedy’ releases both parties from their obligations. 72 That this 
‘remedy’ should be of an exceptional character is refl ected both in the common and 
the civil law traditions. In the common law, termination is only possible if the term 
which has been broken is a ‘condition’ of the contract or if the breach is ‘fundamen-
tal’. Within the civilian tradition, for example in Germany 73 and the Netherlands, 74 
termination is generally only possible if the other party has been given an additional 
period of time to remedy the breach. Both solutions emphasise the subsidiary 
character of termination, which is mirrored on the European and international level, 
67  J Erauw and HM Flechtner, ‘Remedies under the CISG and limits to their uniform character’, in 
P Šarčević and P Volken (eds),  The International Sale of Goods Revisited (Alphen aan den Rijn, 
Kluwer Law International, 2001) 43–44.  Cf. Sivesand (n 62) 105–106. 
68  Directive 99/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 May 1999 on certain 
aspects of the sale of consumer goods and associated guarantees [1999] OJ L 171. 
69 Art 3 Consumer Sales Directive. 
70  See eg, for Dutch private law, JH Nieuwenhuis, ‘Vernietigen, ontbinden of aanpassen (I)’,  WPNR 
1995/6164, 23–26; FB Bakels,  Ontbinding van wederkerige overeenkomsten (diss. Leiden), 
(Deventer, Kluwer, 1993); T Hartlief,  Ontbinding: over ongedaanmaking, bevrijding en rechterli-
jke bevoegdheden bij ontbinding wegens wanprestatie (diss. Groningen), (Deventer, Kluwer, 
1994); MM Stolp,  Ontbinding, schadevergoeding en nakoming : de remedies voor wanprestatie in 
het licht van de beginselen van subsidiariteit en proportionaliteit (diss. Nijmegen), (Deventer, 
Kluwer, 2007). 
71  See Mak (2013) 206. 
72 According to Smith, it is therefore not strictly a remedy; see SA Smith,  Atiyah’s Introduction to 
the Law of Contract , 6 th  ed (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 2005) 371. 
73  § 323 (1) BGB. See M Chen-Wishart and U Magnus, ‘Termination, Price Reduction, and 
Damages’, in Dannemann and Vogenauer (n 15) 660. 
74 Art 6:265 (2) Dutch Civil Code. 
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where either a clear hierarchy of remedies has been introduced (Consumer Sales 
Directive) 75 or the requirement of ‘fundamental’ breach has been adopted as a con-
dition for termination (UNIDROIT Principles). 76 Does the CESL follow this trend? 
5.4.2.2  The Remedial Scheme in B2B Transactions 
 In line with Article 25 of the CISG, the CESL defi nes the non-performance of an 
obligation as ‘any failure to perform that obligation, whether or not it is excused’. 77 
It is a broad and objective test, which gives the aggrieved party access to the scheme 
of remedies. 78 The buyer may require performance, withhold his own performance, 
terminate the contract, reduce the price and claim damages. For commercial buyers, 
this does not mean that the remedy termination may be used immediately. Its 
 application is subject to another, familiar threshold: the non-performance has to be 
‘fundamental’. 79 This is the case if the non-performance ‘substantially deprives the 
other party of what that party was entitled to expect under the contract, unless at the 
time of conclusion of the contract the non-performing party did not foresee and 
could not be expected to have foreseen that result’, or if ‘it is of such a nature as to 
make it clear that the non-performing party’s future performance cannot be relied 
on’. 80 
 Furthermore, the commercial buyer’s rights to exercise any remedy – except 
withholding performance – are subject to cure by the seller and subject to examination 
and notifi cation requirements. 81 The buyer has to examine the goods, or have them 
examined, ‘within as short a period as is reasonable not exceeding 14 days from 
the date of delivery of the goods, supply of digital content or provision of related 
services’. 82 In the event of a lack of conformity, the buyer has to inform the seller 
within a  reasonable time . 83 Finally, the buyer will lose his right to terminate the 
contract ‘if notice of termination is not given within a reasonable time from when 
the right arose or the buyer became, or could be expected to have become, aware of 
the non-performance, whichever is later’. 84 The European Parliament has proposed 
to fi x this period at  two months , 85 which will increase the certainty of this rule and 
follows the example of the Consumer Sales Directive. 
75  Eg Consumer Sales Directive. 
76  Eg in the UNIDROIT Principles, Art 7.3.1. 
77 Art 87(1) CESL. 
78 Art 106(1) CESL. 
79 Art 114–115, 134 and 136 CESL. 
80 Art 87(2)(a) and (b) CESL. 
81 Art 106(2)(a)–(b) CESL. 
82 Art 121(1) CESL. 
83 Art 122(1) CESL. 
84 Art 119 CESL. 
85 Amendment 201. 
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 According to Article 178 CESL, ‘[a]right to enforce performance of an obligation, 
and any right ancillary to such a right, is subject to prescription by the expiry of a 
period of time in accordance’. Because the right to terminate the contract can hardly 
be qualifi ed as a right to  enforce performance, it was unclear whether this remedy 
was subject to prescription. 86 Fortunately, the European Parliament has proposed to 
amend Article 178, to make clear that all remedies for non-performance – except 
withholding performance – are indeed subject to the rules on prescription. 87 The 
short period of prescription is two years, 88 the long period of prescription will be ten 
years (proposal European Commission) or six years (proposal EP). 89 In the event of 
a right to damages for personal injuries, this period is thirty years. 90 
 In any event, the buyer will lose his rights based on a lack of conformity if he 
does not notify the seller ‘within two years from the time at which the goods were 
actually handed over to the buyer in accordance with the contract’. 91 Here, the 
European Parliament proposed to add that the buyer ‘may still reduce the price or 
claim damages, except for loss of profi t, if he has a  reasonable excuse for his failure 
to give the required notice’. 92 Although this amendment is understandable, it makes 
an exception to a clear rule of prescription and does therefore not benefit the 
clarity of that rule. It does, however, point out the subsidiary character of the right 
to terminate the contract, which is not available when the buyer failed to notify the 
seller, even if he has a ‘reasonable excuse’. 
 In its remedial scheme for B2B transactions, the CESL follows its own stated 
objective of preserving a valid contract whenever possible. It introduces a certain 
hierarchy and makes termination conditional upon the presence of a ‘fundamental’ 
non-performance. With one exception, the amendments proposed by the European 
Parliament further enhance the clarity of the rules on examination and notifi cation 
duties, and on the loss and prescription of rights. 
5.4.2.3  The Remedial Scheme in B2C Transactions 
 Quite the opposite can be observed for B2C transactions. Here, the CESL employs 
a highly consumer-friendly regime. First of all, the threshold for termination is not 
applicable. A new requirement is being introduced:
86  Cf. ELI Statement (n 19) 321. 
87 Amendment 248. 
88 Art 179(1) CESL. 
89 Amendment 249. 
90 Art 179(2) CESL. 
91 Art 122(2) CESL. 
92 Amendment 204. 
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 In a consumer sales contract and a contract for the supply of digital content between a trader 
and a consumer, where there is a non-performance because the goods do not conform to the 
contract, the consumer may terminate the contract  unless the lack of conformity is 
insignifi cant . 93 
 This provision signifi cantly lowers the preconditions for termination. It pre-
sumes that any non-conformity is signifi cant and shifts the burden to prove other-
wise to the seller. 94 The seller, in his turn, is not helped with any further defi nitions, 
guidelines or non-exhaustive lists with examples, which makes it very diffi cult to 
predict which lack of conformity is or is not ‘insignifi cant’. Unfortunately, the 
European Parliament has decided not to propose amendments to this provision. 
 Furthermore, the proposal states that the buyer’s rights are generally  not sub-
ject to cure by the seller. 95 Again, this provision signifi cantly lowers the precondi-
tions for termination and abandons the idea of preserving a valid contract as much 
as possible. Only one exception has now been proposed by the European 
Parliament, for goods or digital content ‘which are manufactured, produced or 
modifi ed in accordance with the consumer’s specifi cations or which are clearly 
personalised’. 96 This exception may be welcomed, but it has to be noticed that the 
burden of proof is still shifted to the seller, while a general acknowledgment of a 
right to cure is absent. Add to this that the requirements of examination and noti-
fi cation do not apply to B2C transactions, 97 and it is clear that these rules are 
highly consumer-friendly. 
 It seems that with respect to B2C transactions, the European Commission has not 
been able to avoid inconsistencies with previous instruments of international sales 
law. It departs from the agreed hierarchy under the Consumer Sales Directive and 
returns to the traditional patterns by allowing an almost absolute freedom to choose 
between the different remedies for non-conformity. These rules benefi t the position 
of the consumer more than they benefi t the position of businesses. But that is not 
the main problem here. The problem is that commercial parties cannot rely on 
these rules to predict with a reasonably suffi cient degree of certainty the legal 
consequences of a breach of contract. Without prior notifi cation of the non- 
conformity itself, their contract may easily be terminated, leaving it to the commercial 
seller to prove that the lack of conformity was in fact  insignifi cant or related to a 
tailor-made product. 
93 Art 114(2) CESL. 
94  M von Kossak, ‘The Remedial System under the Proposed Common European Sales Law 
(CESL)’,  European Journal of Commercial Contract Law 1 (2013) 10. 
95 Art 106(3)(a) CESL. 
96 Amendment 192. 
97 Art 106(3)(b) CESL. With the exception of the notifi cation of termination,  see Art 119 CESL and 
Amendment 201. 
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5.4.3  The Relationship Between Damages in Contract 
and Damages in Tort 98 
5.4.3.1  Concurrent Remedies in Contract and Tort 
 A breach of contract may also constitute a violation of a right to property or lead to 
an injury to body or health. 99 If a party decides to claim damages for such losses, 
he may be able to do so on the basis of contractual or tortious liability. This may 
undermine the certainty the EU legislator wants to provide, because the tort law 
regimes of the Member States will often differ in terms of establishment, scope and 
prescription of liability – not only between themselves, but also with the CESL or 
any other future contractual liability regime. A substantive confl ict rule is therefore 
needed to govern the relationship between contract and tort. 
 Within Europe, two contrasting approaches exist: some legal systems confi ne the 
claimant to contract law, others provide him with the opportunity to also invoke tort 
law. The fi rst route has been chosen by the French  Cour de Cassation . Whenever a 
fault has been committed in the context of the performance of a contract, the liability 
may only be based on contract law:
 Les Art 1382 et suivants sont sans application lorsqu’il s’agit d’une faute commise dans 
l’exécution d’une obligation résultant d’un contrat. 100 
 This principle of  non-cumul des responsabilités protects French contract law 
against the breadth of the principle-based and very casuistic character of French tort 
law. 101 German and English private law take the opposite stance: the claimant has 
the  freedom to choose between an action in contract and an action in tort, when both 
are possible on the same facts. The claimant is not precluded to bring an action in 
tort when the liability in contract has been barred or exempted:
 Er ist insbesondere nicht gehindert, auf die Haftung aus unerlaubter Handlung zurückzug-
reifen, wenn vertragliche Ansprüche – etwa wegen eingetretener Verjährung oder einer nur 
sie erfassenden Haftungsfreizeichnung – nicht mehr bestehen. 102 
98  Parts of this section have been previously published in R de Graaff,  Something old, something 
new, something borrowed, something blue? (Leiden/The Hague, Jongbloed, 2014). 
99  Cf. C von Bar and U Drobnig,  The Interaction of Contract Law and Tort and Property Law in 
Europe. A Comparative Study (München, Sellier European Law Publishers, 2004) 190–191. 
100  Cass. 11 January 1922,  DP 1922.I.16. Reaffi rmed in Cass. 2 e  civ. 26 May 1992,  Bull. Civ. 1992.
II.154; Cass. 1 e  civ. 19 March 2002,  CCC 2002/106, n° 00-13971. See Brieskorn 2010, p. 218. 
101  On the (mis)conceptions about the character of French tort law,  see JS Borghetti, ‘The Culture 
of Tort Law in France’,  JETL 3 (2012/2) 158–182. 
102  BGH, 24/11/76,  BGHZ 67, 362 et seq, my italics. This is still the doctrine under German law, 
see T Zerres,  Bürgerliches Recht. Eine Einführung in das Zivilrecht und die Gründzuge des 
Zivilprozessrechts (Heidelberg, Springer, 2009) 314. 
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 The House of Lords eventually followed this line of reasoning. 103 Lord Goff of 
Chieveley expressed the  ratio decidendi on behalf of the Lords:
 [T]he plaintiff, who has available to him concurrent remedies in contract and tort,  may 
choose that remedy which appears to him to be the most advantageous . 104 
 The starting point is the freedom of the claimant to choose between the different 
applicable regimes. 
5.4.3.2  The Dividing Line Between Contract and Tort 
 Both solutions discussed above result in the precedence of one regime over the 
other. Either tort law is excluded as a matter of principle ( non-cumul ), or the least 
advantageous regime is excluded as a result of the claimant’s choice ( free concur-
rence ). These solutions seem straightforward, but there is one complicating factor: 
the dividing line between contract and tort is ‘by no means as clear as might be 
imagined’. 105 
 Modern contract lawyers question whether the division between contractual 
obligations, resulting wholly from an exchange of promises, and tortious obliga-
tions, imposed by the law, is still accurate. Conversely, tort lawyers struggle with 
certain cases of tortious liability where the parties are in a contractual  relationship. 106 
In 1974, Gilmore proclaimed ‘the death of contract’, stating that contract law ‘is 
being reabsorbed into the mainstream of “tort”’. 107 He was supported by Atiyah, 
who argued that the idea ‘that tort liabilities are wholly different from contractual 
liabilities because the latter arise from consensual obligations is not soundly based, 
either in logic or in history’. 108 These fi ndings are supported by the fact that one and 
103  Earlier – in 1985 – the House of Lords had expressly rejected the application of tort law within 
a contractual relationship: ‘Their Lordships do not believe that there is anything to the advantage 
of the law’s development in searching for a liability in tort where the parties are in a contractual 
relationship.’ See HL, 3/07/85,  AC 1985/80 at 107 ( Tai Hing Cotton Mill Ltd/Liu Chong Hing 
Bank ), statement Lord Scarman. 
104  HL 25 July 1994, [1995] 2  AC 145, at 184 ( Henderson/Merrett Syndicates Ltd ), my italics. 
Earlier, the Irish Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of Canada issued similar judgments: 
IESC,  IR 1979/249 ( Finlay/Murtagh ); SCC, [1986] 31  DLR (4th) 481 ( Central Trust Company/
Rafuse ). Cf. Ward 2010, p. 23. 
105  R Zimmermann,  The law of obligations: Roman foundations of the civilian tradition (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 1996) 11; and D Howarth, ‘The General Conditions of Unlawfulness’, in 
AS Hartkamp et al. (eds),  Towards a European Civil Code (Alphen aan den Rijn, Kluwer Law 
International, 2011) 848. 
106  Cf. S Deakin, A Johnston and B Markesinis,  Markesinis and Deakin’s Tort Law. Seventh Edition 
(Oxford, Clarendon Press, 2013) 15. 
107  G Gilmore,  The Death of Contract (Columbus, Ohio State University Press, 1974) 87. 
108  P Atiyah,  The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract (Oxford, OUP, 1979) 505. 
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the same legal issue is characterised as belonging to contract law in one country, 
while it is dealt with by tort law in another country. 109 
 Under French law, it is arguably most diffi cult to cope with this interaction. The 
principle of  non-cumul may force courts to deny a contractual  relationship in order 
to be able to apply tort law. 110 Yet, some problems have been solved by comple-
menting the obligations arising from a contract with the requirements of equity, 
customs and the law on the basis of Articles 1134 and 1135 of the French Civil 
Code. 111 
 The principle of  free concurrence forces the courts to limit the freedom of the 
claimant to bring any action he wishes, in order to do justice to the interests of the 
defendant. 112 Under German law, an exception is made when ‘the application of tort 
law would (…)  frustrate the purpose of a contract law norm’. 113 As Koch wrote:
 Diese Regel [a free choice for the claimant]  soll jedoch keinen Bestand haben ,  wenn , als 
Folge konkurrierender Ansprüche,  der Zweck einer Vorschrift unterlaufen wird , was insbe-
sondere bei Haftungsmilderungen und Verjährungsfragen relevant ist. 114 
 Under English law, the concurrence between contract and tort is ‘subject (…) to 
ascertaining whether the tortious duty is  so inconsistent with the applicable contract 
that, in accordance with ordinary principle, the parties must be taken to have agreed 
that the tortious remedy is to be limited or excluded’. 115 In most cases, tort law will 
therefore not afford greater protection, because a claimant may benefi t from its 
application only  in the absence of a limitation or exclusion of liability in the 
contract. 116 
 It has become clear that different legal systems have different reasons for allow-
ing recourse to tort law or not. The possibility to invoke tort law is limited when it 
goes against the wording of the contract (England) or against statutory law 
(Germany), or as a matter of principle, because it would risk to open the fl oodgates 
of litigation and compensation (France). 117 What are the implications for the inter-
action between the CESL and national tort law? 
109  Eg defective products give the consumer a claim in tort in England, while French courts allow 
an action in contract. See Zimmermann (n 104) 11–12. Cf. Von Bar and Drobnig (n 98) 848. 
110  Cf. Von Bar & Drobnig (n 98) 40–41. 
111  For France, see MW Hesselink, ‘De opmars van de goede trouw in het Franse contractenrecht’, 
 WPNR (1994/6154) 694–698. 
112  Cf. JH Nieuwenhuis, ‘They still rule us from their graves’,  WPNR (2009/6693) 3. 
113  Von Bar & Drobnig (n 98) 201, emphasis added. 
114  D Koch,  Produkthaftung: zur Konkurrenz von Kaufrecht und Deliktsrecht (Berlin, Duncker und 
Humblot, 1995) 227, emphasis added. 
115  HL 25 July 1994, [1995] 2  AC 145, at 184 ( Henderson v.  Merrett Syndicates Ltd. ), my italics. 
See also Cartwright 2013, p. 51. 
116  Cf. J O’Donovan,  Lender Liability (London, Sweet & Maxwell Ltd, 2005) 197–198. 
117  Cf. W van Gerven & S Covemaecker,  Verbintenissenrecht (Leuven, Acco, 2006) 310. 
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5.4.3.3  The Dividing Line Between CESL and National Tort Law 
 As we have seen, the purpose of the European Commission is to create a  self- 
standing regime of sales law. However, Recital 28 of the Regulation stresses that 
the CESL should not govern matters ‘outside the remits of contract law’ and stipu-
lates that ‘[t]his Regulation should be without prejudice to the Union or national law 
in relation to any such matters’. 118 Recital 27 lists some examples:
 These issues include legal personality, the invalidity of a contract arising from lack of 
capacity, illegality or immorality, the determination of the language of the contract, matters 
of non-discrimination, representation, plurality of debtors and creditors, change of parties 
including assignment, set-off and merger, property law including the transfer of ownership, 
intellectual property law  and the law of torts . Furthermore,  the issue of whether concurrent 
contractual and non-contractual liability claims can be pursued together falls outside the 
scope of the Common European Sales Law . 119 
 This statement is understandable. Efforts to harmonise private law have so far 
concentrated on contract and consumer law, not on tort law. 120 The law of torts 
 concerns a different economic and political reality, making it diffi cult to demon-
strate the necessity of EU legislation. 121 Only one legislative instrument within the 
area of private law, also a Regulation, 122 clearly aims to  replace the national law of 
torts with a ground for non-contractual liability at EU level. 123 Yet it explicitly states 
that the interpretation of key concepts is left to the applicable system of national 
private law. 124 
118  Some areas are also mentioned in Recital 28: ‘For example, information duties which are 
imposed for the protection of health and safety or environmental reasons should remain outside the 
scope of the Common European Sales Law. This Regulation should further be without prejudice to 
the information requirements of Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 12 December 2006 on services in the internal market.’ 
119  Emphasis added. 
120  Such efforts have only been pursued at an academic level, for example in Book IV of the Draft 
Common Frame of Reference. Although the Directive on Product Liability creates an “extra” level 
of liability, it ‘shall not affect any rights which an injured person may have according to the rules 
of the law of contractual or non-contractual liability’ (Art 13), and therefore it does not harmonise 
the general law of torts.  See Council Directive 85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985 on the approximation 
of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning liability 
for defective products. 
121  Cf. Howarth (n 104) 848–851. 
122  Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 
2009 on credit rating agencies, amended by Regulation (EU) No 462/2013 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 and Regulation (EU) No 513/2011 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2011. 
123 Art 35 (1) states: ‘Where a credit rating agency has committed, intentionally or with gross 
 negligence, any of the infringements listed in Annex III having an impact on a credit rating, an 
investor or issuer may claim damages from that credit rating agency for damage caused to it due to 
that infringement.’ 
124  See Art 35 (4): ‘Terms such as “damage”, “intention”, “gross negligence”, “reasonably relied”, 
“due care”, “impact”, “reasonable” and “proportionate” which are referred to in this Article but are 
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 Although the Regulation stresses that the CESL should not govern matters 
 outside the remits of contract law, this does not mean that there is no overlap 
between CESL and national tort law. By bringing consequential losses within the 
scope of the CESL, the European Commission clearly intended to include a core 
area in which contractual and tortious liability overlap. 125 An aggrieved party may 
be entitled to a sum of money ‘as compensation for loss, injury or damage’, 126 
including ‘economic loss and non-economic loss in the form of pain and suffering’ 127 
and ‘future loss which the debtor could expect to occur’. 128 
 When the victim wishes to claim damages for such losses, the question of 
whether he is allowed to bring an action in tort will be a matter for the applicable 
national system of private law. When recourse to tort law is allowed, the question 
remains whether and to what extent this freedom of choice should be limited. 
Because consequential losses are included within the scope of the CESL, and 
because ‘only the [CESL] shall govern the matters addressed in its rules’, 129 it seems 
that the CJEU has to provide this answer. In doing so, it will be guided by general 
principles of EU law. As Wendehorst wrote:
 At the end of the day, it should be the ideas of  effet-utile on the one hand and of  subsidiarity 
and proportionality on the other that count, ie we have to ask whether the uniformity of 
results which the CESL (…) seeks to achieve throughout the EU would require the CESL 
(…) rules to be exclusive in a particular area or whether parallel regimes of an entirely 
 different nature, in particular tort and property, must be tolerated. 130 
 This is not an easy task. On the one hand, the Court of Justice will be tempted to 
provide all the answers by interpretation of the CESL rules and the existing  acquis 
communaitaire . This is important for countries such as France, where the  non-cumul 
principle forces the courts to protect the CESL from the breadth of French tort law 
not defi ned, shall be interpreted and applied in accordance with the applicable national law as 
determined by the relevant rules of private international law.’ 
125  Some authors are very critical of the proposed defi nitions: ‘In placing loss of an economic and 
non-economic nature, injury, and damage on the same level, the proposed regulation confuses 
protected interests with heads of damage. (…) It is diffi cult to escape the conclusion that these 
provisions need thorough re-drafting.’ This has not happened thus far by amendments of the 
European Parliament. See H Eidenmüller, N Jansen, EM Kieninger, G Wagner and R Zimmermann, 
‘The Proposal for a Regulation on a Common European Sales Law: Defi cits of the Most Recent 
Textual Layer of European Contract Law’,  The Edinburgh Law Review 3 (2012) 340. Interestingly, 
the international counterpart of the CESL – the UN Convention on Contracts for the International 
Sale of Goods (CISG) –  excludes liability for death or personal injury from its scope. See Art 5 
CISG. 
126 Art 2 (g) Reg CESL. 
127 Art 2 (c) Reg CESL. 
128 Art 159 (2) CESL. 
129  See Art 11 Reg CESL. 
130  See the comments by Wendehorst in Schulze et al. (eds),  Common European Sales Law 
(CESL) – Commentary (Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2012) 70, emphasis added.  Cf. Howarth (n 104) 
849, according to whom the question surrounding harmonisation in this area of law will always be 
‘whether the degree of anomaly which results from cases crossing the contract-tort divide is 
 suffi cient to justify what otherwise would be a violation of the principle of subsidiarity.’ 
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as much as they are used to protect French contract law from French tort law. In 
such a situation, all answers have to be given within the remits of contract law. 
 However, providing such answers may involve a very inventive interpretation of 
the CESL, which is written as a comprehensive set of contract rules and is silent or 
at least not explicit on some matters, such as causation. The Court of Justice will be 
hampered by the very limitations of the CESL itself. When asked to do so, this may 
be an argument for an English or German court to provide the answers within the 
remits of national tort law, especially when it concerns sensitive issues on which 
there is no European consensus. 131 
 In any event, the attempt to draw a clear line between the CESL and tort law 
would have been ill-fated. This does not mean that the CESL rules provide less 
certainty than national systems of private law do. It does mean that the claim by the 
European Commission that commercial parties would only have to acquaint 
 themselves with one common set of rules was untrue. Also with regard to a future 
instrument of contract law, these parties have to bear in mind that such an instru-
ment will not provide all the answers, that claimants will try to escape into tort law 
and that national courts follow different approaches in this respect. 
5.5  General Conclusion 
 In this chapter, we have measured the CESL rules against the stated objective of 
providing a high degree of legal certainty through a common set of rules. In doing 
so, we have taken a business perspective. We have assessed the rules governing 
three important stages in the life cycle of a contract: the rules that determine whether 
CESL applies to a contract, the interpretation of entire agreement clauses and the 
relationship between the different remedies for breach of contract. We have exam-
ined whether these rules are clear and predictable. 
 With regard to the fi rst stage – formal and material scope rules – we conclude 
that the CESL would not have brought legal certainty as advertised. 132 Some scope 
rules are extremely diffi cult to establish: this is the case when parties have to 
ascertain whether they qualify as an SME. What is more, some scope rules are 
virtually impossible to establish: this is the case, for instance, when parties have 
to ascertain what the ‘relevant location’ of an internet retailer is that has branches 
all over the EU. Finally, some scope rules require an investigation into the otherwise 
applicable law: this is the case when opt-in rules apply and as regards property 
law matters. It is foreseeable that the rules will not become clearer if the future 
instrument will be limited to ‘distance contracts’, i.e. ‘online purchases of digital 
content and tangible goods’. This will add yet another limiting scope rule to the 
already existing ones. 
131  Such as the derogation from a prescription period, or liability  in solidum of producers/sellers. 
132  See above, para 5.2. 
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 With regard to the second stage, the CESL rules stress the importance of entire 
agreement clauses, while they provide for a criterion to assess whether parties could 
rely on such a clause. Not the absence of negotiations is decisive, but whether  parties 
were able to infl uence the content of their contract terms. Despite the ambiguous 
formulation in Article 72 CESL, which implies that prior statements are not part 
of the contract but may nonetheless be taken into account when interpreting the 
contract, the interpretation rules facilitate parties that wish to create legal certainty 
by using entire agreement- or merger clauses. In all, we believe these rules to be 
suffi ciently clear and advise the Commission to consider these rules for its future 
instrument, in order to enhance the predictability of the contractual arrangements 
between commercial parties. 133 
 With regard to the fi nal stage – the remedies for breach of contract – a nuanced 
picture emerges. The CESL remedial scheme in B2B transactions lives up to expec-
tations. It introduces a clear hierarchy and makes termination conditional upon the 
presence of a ‘fundamental’ non-performance. 134 Quite the opposite may be 
observed in B2C transactions. Here, the Commission chose to depart from the hier-
archy under the Consumer Sales Directive and to return to the traditional patterns by 
awarding the consumer an almost absolute freedom to choose between the  different 
remedies for non-conformity. Whereas these rules may be clear in themselves, we 
do not think commercial parties can rely on them to predict with a reasonably 
suffi cient degree of certainty the legal consequences of a breach of contract. 135 
 Furthermore, if a party decides to claim damages for consequential losses, he 
may do so on the basis of contractual or tortious liability. This may undermine the 
certainty an instrument of European contract law wants to provide, because tort law 
regimes of the Member States often differ in terms of establishment, scope and 
prescription, not only between themselves, but also with the CESL or any other 
future European contractual liability regime. Although the European Commission 
clearly intended to include some issues traditionally belonging to tort law into the 
scope of the CESL, the attempt to draw a clear line between these two areas will be 
ill-fated. Parties have to bear in mind that a future instrument of contract law will 
not provide all the answers, that claimants will try to escape into tort law and that 
national courts follow different approaches in this respect. Any prudent commercial 
party will therefore have to consider non-contractual liability claims. 136 
 In our opinion, the overall conclusion must be that the proposed CESL rules do 
not live up to the expectations. With a few notable exceptions, they do not enable 
contracting parties to predict, with a suffi cient degree of certainty, the legal 
 consequences of entering into the (CESL) contract. From a business perspective, the 
current CESL rules are not crafted well enough to serve as a  blueprint for future 
legislation. 
133  See above, para 5.3. 
134  See above, para 5.4.2.2. 
135  See above, para 5.4.2.3. 
136  See above, para 5.4.3.3. 
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 It is expected that the CESL rules will be modifi ed and included in a ‘digital 
single market package’, which is intended to boost online consumer sales. While 
drafting this new instrument, we do hope that the EU legislature will take the 
abovementioned recommendations into account. The Commission already 
announced its objectives:
 The Commission will put forward clear contractual rules for online sales of both physical 
goods like shoes or furniture and digital content, like e-books or apps. It will fi ll in the 
 existing legislative gap at EU level regarding digital content and will harmonise a key set of 
rules for physical goods. This will create a level-playing fi eld for businesses, allow them to 
take full advantage of the Digital Single Market and sell with confi dence across borders. At 
the same time, it will boost consumer trust in online purchases. Consumers will have even 
more solid and effective rights. 137 
 The Commission is still as ambitious as the late king Rex. Let us hope that no 
picket will have to appear before the Brussels palace, carrying a sign that reads: 
“How can anybody follow a rule that nobody can understand?” 
137  European Commission, Fact sheet,  Who will benefi t from a Digital Single Market? 6 May 2015, 
 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-4920_nl.htm 
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